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lurisdiction of Referee in
Bankruptcy Over NonDischargeable Claims
By WM. HEDGES ROBINSON, JR.
The jurisdiction of the referee in bankruptcy over a creditor of the
bankrupt depends upon the nature of the claim asserted by the creditor
against the bankrupt according to the principle established in the recent
case of In re Martinez (C. C. A. 10th, No. 2089, decided October 21,
1940, rehearing denied November 19, 1940). In this case the bankrupt
applied in writing for a loan from the Personal Finance Company of
Colorado. In this written application he made certain representations
concerning his financial status and ability to repay the loan.
These representations were materially false and the creditor began
an action in the state court during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding, seeking to recover damages from the bankrupt on account of the
false pretenses and representations made by the bankrupt in his application. The referee promptly enjoined the company from further prosecution of the suit in court.
The company thereupon filed an application to vacate and set aside
the restraining order, attaching to its application a copy of the verified
complaint filed in the state court. The referee and federal district court
denied the application. Upon appeal to the circuit court, Circuit Judge
Phillips pointed out that Section 17 of the bankruptcy act (11 U. S.
C. A., Sec. 35) provides that a discharge in bankruptcy would not release a bankrupt from a liability for obtaining money by false pretenses
or false representations. Since in this case the claim asserted by the company against the bankrupt was one from which the bankrupt would not
be released by a discharge in bankruptcy, it was error to enjoin the action
in the state court. Therefore, the injunction against the company should
be dissolved.
This decision reaffirms the principle asserted In re Lawrence (Dist.
Ct. Ala.), 163 Fed. 131 (1908), wherein under similar circumstances
the court held that in the event the state court suit was a bona fide proceeding for obtaining money by false pretenses or representations, the
referee has "no jurisdiction to try the merits of the suit, but must remand
the parties to the state court, and permit that court to pass upon the
merits of the contention as to whether it is barred by the discharge in
bankruptcy."
This case and a large number of cases which follow its basic principle clearly establish that dischargeability of the debt is the basis of the
jurisdiction of the referee in bankruptcy over that particular debt and the
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creditor asserting it. The question which these cases suggest and which
remained unanswered until recently was: How is the question of jurisdiction of the referee to be determined in these cases where a suit is pending in a state court on a liability which the creditor asserts is non-dischargeable in bankruptcy?
Should the referee require the creditor to submit conclusive proof
on the non-dischargeability of the claim? Should the referee require
that the creditor submit such proof of the non-dischargeability of the
claim as would be sufficient to withstand the test of a non-suit or directed
verdict in the state court? Should the referee do anything more than to
require the creditor to submit to him a copy of the verified complaint
filed in the state court?
These questions, which arose by virtue of unanswered implications
in In re Lawrence, were again suggested but left unanswered in -the case
of Family Small Loan Company of Richmond us. Mason (C. C. A. 4,
1933), 67 Fed. (2) 207, wherein the court, reaffirming the principle of
the Lawrence case, remarked: "Interesting questions discussed in the
briefs as to whether the bankruptcy court should hear evidence on the
nature of the debt where the pleadings in the state court show a debt that
is not dischargeable, need not be considered, as here the court considered
the evidence presented in the form of a stipulation by counsel; and this
evidence, as well as the pleadings in the state court, showed a debt which
was not dischargeable."
These questions have been answered, however, in the case of In re
Alvino (C. C. A. 2, 1940), 111 Fed. (2) 642, which states that the
lower court was in error in holding that the creditor should have submitted proof of. fraud. The creditor "did enough when it showed the
court a copy of the complaint filed in the action in the state court."
This de6sion presents the most satisfactory answer to the problem.
If the creditor is faced with submitting conclusive proof of non-dischargeability of the claim before the referee, he is in fact forced to try his
case in two courts on the same facts before he is entitled to relief. If the
creditor is able to convince the referee on the order to show cause, he
nevertheless is faced in the state court with the task of proving fraud in
the inception of the obligation. Here the creditor may either lose or
win the verdict, depending upon the host of things incident to the trial
of a law suit, even though he has once conclusively proved his case. If
he fails to convince the referee, he is faced with the principle of res adjudicata should he bring a suit in the state court after discharge. Any rule
which is dependent upon the degree of proof to be submitted to the referee by the creditor on the dischargeability of the debt is subject to these
same criticisms plus the additional problem of determining whether the
proof meets the degree thought to be necessary by each individual referee.
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The solution set forth in In re Alino makes the matter a very
simple and inexpensive one for both debtor and creditor. If the complaint in the state court unmistakably makes the action one in deceit for
obtaining money by false representation or false pretense, the referee can
immediately determine that he has no jurisdiction over the matter. Thus
the entire issue of fraud is left properly with the state court to determine.
If, on the other hand, it finds that there was not fraud in incurring the
debt, the debtor is still protected by the adjudication and discharge in
bankruptcy. If the state court finds that the debt was incurred by false
pretenses or representations, the creditor is left to the remedies provided
by the state law.
In the exercise of these remedies during the pendency of the proceedings in bankruptcy, the creditor must avoid, however, any interference with property under jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. If the
creditor attaches or in any manner interferes with the possession or control of property of the bankrupt properly within the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court, then it must answer to that court for improper interference with the orderly administration of the estate of the bankrupt.

Edward . Ruff
Reports on the
Colorado Junior Bar Conference
It is too early in the year to report any active achievements, but an
excellent start has been made toward one of the most successful years in
the short history of the Conference. Committee chairmen and members
have been appointed, the membership of each committee being subject to
change by the chairman. The council posts have been filled from all
eligible districts. By resolution at the annual meeting, the Conference
chairmen of past years were made honorary council members without
vote.
Several members of the Co.nference volunteered on October 16 to
assist the various boards and commissions throughout the state in the
registration under the Selective Service Act, and at the present time several
are serving as advisors to the registrants.
The most urgent requirement at the present time is that all the
members realize that there are a great number of younger lawyers in the
state who are not members of the organization, and do their best to show
these men the advantages of membership in the Conference.
In the past year the new members of the Conference were more than
double its membership quota. and it is hoped that we can do as well, or
better, this year.

